Here’s a pet peeve: the widespread belief that any two people, regardless of the disparity in their levels of intellectual development, are destined to fruitfully converse, as long as both exhibit “good communication skills”.
First, acknowledgment where it’s due. It is indeed an important life skill to be able to break down complex ideas and make them accessible to nonspecialists.
“If you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough” is a remark on this subject often attributed to Einstein (though, as I gather, apocryphally). The idea is that explaining something simply in ways anyone can understand is the sign of true mastery of a subject, because only deep knowledge can allow you adroitly navigate up and down the levels of abstraction required to do so.
Those of us in the business world also know about the importance of connecting with diverse personalities–customers, managers, coworkers. In the startup economy, there’s a well-known art of the “elevator pitch”, wherein a nontrivial business model can be packaged into ten-second soundbites that can hold a harried investor’s attention–the given being that investors have the attention spans of an ADHD-afflicted chipmunk.
I would also concur with those who have observed that scholarly interests which don’t lend themselves to ready explanation–that are “too complex” for most mortals to fathom–are often the refuge of academic impostors. There are a lot of unscrupulous careerists and political operators in academia, more interested in what is politely termed “prestige” than in advancement of their discipline and of human understanding. These shysters, along with more innocent (but complicit) graduate students caught up in the pressures of the “publish or perish” economy, are the spammers of house journals, conferences and research publications, often hiding behind the shield of “well, you see, it’s really complicated”. Most legitimate scholarly endeavours can be explained quite straightforwardly, if hardly comprehensively. Complexity is an inscrutable fortress and a conversation-stopper in which people more interested in being cited and operating “schools of thought” (of which they are the headmasters, naturally) hide from accountability for scholarly merit.
All this has been polished into the more general meme that productive interaction is simply a question of “learning to communicate”. With the right effort, anyone can communicate usefully with anyone. It doesn’t matter if someone is speaking from a position of education and intelligence to someone bereft of those gifts. Any failure to achieve necessary and sufficient understanding is postulated as a failure of communication skills, perhaps even social graces (e.g. the stereotypical nerdling).
This is an extreme conclusion fraught with peril. We should tread carefully least we impale ourselves on the hidden obstacles of our boundless cultural enthusiasm for simplification.
First, there’s a critical distinction between clarity and simplicity. It is quite possible to take an idea simple at heart and meander around it circuitously, taking a scenic journey full of extraneous details. Admittedly, technologists such as programmers can be especially bad about this; their explanations are often vacillatory, uncommitted to any particular level of abstraction or scope, and full of tangents about implementation details which fascinate them immeasurably but are fully lost on their audience. I’ve been guilty of that on more than a few occasions.
However, there is an intellectually destructive alchemy by which the virtues of clarity and succinctness become transformed into the requirement of brevity. Not all concepts are easily reducible or lend themselves to pithy sloganeering–not without considerable trade-offs in intellectual honesty. This is a point lost on marketers and political activists alike. It leads to big ideas and grandiose proclamations that trample well-considered, moderate positions, as the latter are thermodynamically outmatched by simplistic reductions. Brandolini’s Law, or the Bullshit Asymmetry Principle, states: “The amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it.” As always, sex sells–a fact of which the TEDdies have a firm grasp, with their peddling of seductive insight porn. As Evgeny Morov said:
Brevity may be the soul of wit, or of lingerie, but it is not the soul of analysis. The TED ideal of thought is the ideal of the “takeaway”—the shrinkage of thought for people too busy to think.”
Second, the idea that “communication skills” are at the heart of all matters has wormed its way into pedagogy rather disturbingly in the form of group work and so-called collaborative models of learning. As the thinking goes, the diversity of a student body is an asset; students have much to learn from each other, not just the lecturer, and encouraging them to do so prepares them for “the real world”, where they’re ostensibly going to be coworkers, police officer and arrestee, and so on.
It reminds me of an episode recounted by my favourite author William Blum in his memoir about the political upheaval of the 1960s:
At one point I enrolled for a class in Spanish at the so-called Free University of Washington, and at the first meeting I was flabbergasted to hear the “teacher” announce that he probably didn’t know much more Spanish than the students. And that’s the way it should be, he informed us–no authoritarian hierarchy. He wanted to learn from us as much as we wanted to learn from him.”
The counterculture kids were challenging incumbent hierarchies of authority. I see the same kind of anti-intellectualism recycled today into the putatively more laudable goal of social flattening.
But there’s a limit to the productive fruit of such ventures. It’s best illustrated by an anecdote from my own life.
When I was a freshman at the University of Georgia, I took an obligatory writing and composition course, as part of the infamous “core requirements” (remedial high school) that characterise the first year or two of four-year undergraduate university education in the US. One day in November, our drafts of an expository essay were due, presumably for commentary and feedback on writing mechanics by the English graduate student teaching the course.
Instead, we were paired with a random classmate and told to critique each other’s papers. My partner was an Agriculture major–a farmer’s son, he readily volunteered–who was only at the university because his father insisted that he needed a college degree before taking up his place in the family business. I would estimate his reading level to have been somewhere in the neighbourhood of fifth to eighth grade. I was going to critique his paper, and he was going to critique mine.
Candidly, his paper was largely unintelligible gibberish; it would have taken many improbable megajoules of energy input much for it to rise merely to the level of “unpolished”. Were the problems strictly mechanical–paragraphs lacking topic sentences, no discernible thesis in sight, no clear evidentiary relationship between his central claims and the sentences supporting them–I would have earned my keep in a few minutes with a red pen.
The problem was much deeper: his ideas were fundamentally low-quality, benighted in a commonsensically evident kind of way. They were at once trite, obvious, and all but irrelevant to the assigned topic. The few empirical claims made ranged from startling falsehoods to profoundly unfalsifiable arrangements of New Agey words that grated on the ear of someone accustomed to the idea that the purpose of arranging words was to convey meaning. He was hurtling at light speed toward an F. What could I do, rewrite his paper for him? How would I even begin to explain what is wrong with it? There was no room to start small or to evolve toward bigger, more summative problem statements; it was a genuine can of worms: pry it open, and all the worms come out to play at once.
I don’t mean to impugn him as a human being; he just wasn’t suited to the university’s humanities wing, whose business was reputed to be the life of the mind, set in a programme of liberal education. He didn’t know how to argue or how to write — period. He was more of a hero of proletarian labour, as it were, reared in a life script ineffably different to my own, never having crossed paths with me or anyone else in the pampered, effete, bourgeois “knowledge work” setting before, and destined to never cross paths with me in any such setting again. I was utterly paralysed; there just wasn’t much I could do to help him. Plainly, I couldn’t tell him that his thoughts issue forth from a nexus of civilisation unrecognisable to me. There wasn’t much of anything to say, really. I made a few perfunctory remarks and called it a day.
His feedback on my paper, which in turn suffered from organisational and topic transition problems that continue to dog my writing today, was: “Looks good, man!” Verily, his piercing insight knew no bounds. We really learned a lot from each other that day. Along the way, I overheard bits and pieces of a rather erudite peer review by a considerably better-educated classmate. Why couldn’t she review my paper? It would have almost certainly helped. My writing wasn’t stellar, and my devoted readership–I do it all for you, much love!–knows it still isn’t.
Later, I privately enquired to the lecturer as to how I was supposed to condense a lifetime–however hampered by the limitations of my age and experience–of literacy, intellectual curiosity, familial and cultural academic background, semi-decent public education and informal training in polemic and rhetoric into a functional critique that would realistically benefit my beleaguered cohort and help him write a better paper. She replied: “That was the whole point; you need to work on your communication skills.”
In defiance not only of the comme il faut tenets of political correctness, but in fact–in some sense–of the national mythos of our putatively classless and democratic melting pot, I brazenly suggest something that is, I think, considered fairly obvious elsewhere: not all categories of people are destined to communicate deeply or productively.
When such discord inevitably manifests, we should not reflexively blame so-called communication skills or processes. People operate in silos that are sometimes “civilisationally incommensurable”, as it were, and sometimes there just isn’t much to communicate. This is the reality of culture, class and education, and the thinking on collaborative learning and teaching methodologies should incorporate that awareness instead of unavailingly denying it. Matching partners in group activities by sociological and educational extraction clearly presents political challenges in the modern classroom, though. Instead, I would encourage teachers to rediscover–“reimagine” is the appropriate neologism, isn’t it?–the tired, hackneyed premise of leadership by example. At the risk of a little methodological authoritarianism and a few droopy eyelids, perhaps the best way to ensure that students leave your course better than you found them is to focus on their communication with you. They’ll have the rest of their lives to figure out how to transact with each other.
In tech, we’re always talking about workplace ergonomics, the fine points of Aeron chairs and standing desks, the wretchedness of open-plan spaces and cubicle farms versus private offices, how many monitors to have, and so on. Usually, I’m an eager participant, very much attuned to the idea that comfort and pleasant aesthetics are essential to output, motivation, and sustained concentration in high-focus, specialised creative labour.
But sometimes it does help to get a little perspective. A glance at the work environments of many world-class musicians, scholars, authors and researchers from the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, or at the cramped physical environments in which highly capable, clever IT people work in developing countries, may convey a useful reminder that if you really want to do something, you can do it just about anywhere.
For that matter, my first job, as a technical hand and later sysadmin at a small-town ISP, when I was a bright-eyed, bushy-tailed 18-20 year old, was in office space not altogether Class A; it was a freezing, windowless dungeon in a small 4-room suite whose HVAC controls were shared with a machine room in need of constant, high-intensity cooling, and the rooms were littered with stray computer hardware and accessorised with fairly second-rate furniture. Yet, I’ve never been so productive or so excited to go to work since those days.
In fact, the physical configurations in which I eagerly wrote code for many hours as a teenager are downright sadistic by cushy Silicon Valley standards; a crude wooden desk from Big Lots, a far too low wooden dining room chair, a 7 lbs (~3.1 kg) laptop, a shared family PC in the tiny living room of graduate student barracks. And what a PC that was–a 386SX/40 with 2 MB of RAM, at a time when most respectable citizens were packing 60 and 90 MHz Pentiums. We were poor–by American standards, anyway–but I didn’t really notice.
I have a friend and colleague who travels around the world, living his digital life out of a rather clunky Lenovo ThinkPad, sat on a variety of surfaces, whichever are available at the moment. While he’s not usually staying in mosquito-ridden youth hostels in the Congolese jungle, I fully grant, he doesn’t have 30″ IPS displays or wrist rests, to say nothing of a snazzy office with an adjustable-height desk and a foosball table–you know, the bare essentials for Ruby on Rails jockeys in the Bay Area. Yet he’s one of the most disciplined and entrepreneurially successful people I know. I think of him every time someone says that they “literally cannot work” without a chair with proper lumbar support.
More extremely, some of my Armenian colleagues learned to code in a time when Yerevan was largely without grid electricity, during the disastrous Nagorno-Karabakh War and its contemporaneous power crisis. They hooked up their clobbered-together computers to car batteries for a few hours day, batteries which they improvised some means of charging occasionally, usually by leeching surplus electricity from cables to critical facilities that did have it. They’re some of the most capable and multifarious IT guys (not to mention electrical engineers!) I know.
Yes, one’s eyes, back, wrists, etc. become more fragile and capricious with age, and it would be prudent to afford them some care. As I near 30, I’m acutely aware of that fact, having all sorts of aches and pains I didn’t used to have.
Nevertheless, my conclusion on the psychological purpose of constant twiddling of small features of our environment – desks, monitor sizes and so forth – is that it’s more about tricking yourself into working on stuff you don’t really want to do. It’s to create the illusion that now everything is truly right with the world, and productivity will seamlessly spring forth from one’s fingers. It’s a means of papering over the fact that you’d rather be doing something else. If most of us were actually doing something stimulating, we’d probably be happy enough doing it on a rooftop while it’s snowing.
To drive that point home, a story:
I rented an office in a repurposed Soviet-era building in Yerevan, Armenia for a while. I should pause to say that this was very much a “you get what you pay for” kind of thing, so please don’t think all life in Yerevan looks like this. Anyway, here’s what was going on in the very room next door some of the time (“renovation”), and also a picture of the ice that formed under my doorway some winter days:
The “included” Internet connectivity was sorely lacking; in the end, I ended up with some WiMax receiver that gave me 384k/128k on a good day. I grumbled about it some of the time, sure. But I also wrote much of our product’s middleware, user interface and API documentation there. I was furiously productive, and it would not be unreasonable to say that our product made a titanic generational leap whilst I was there. Some other parts of this product infrastructure were written, also at a very impressive clip, whilst sat in a stiff chair and Spartan metal table in the rentable upstairs workspace at Sankt Oberholz, a Berlin coffee shop and coworking enterprise situated in a late 19th century building. I was hunched over uncomfortably, my nose stuck in a 13″ ultrabook with a loathsome keyboard. My eyes burned and my wrists tingled by the end of most days.
Now I’m sitting in my eminently comfortable Class A office in Atlanta, with great connectivity and a 32″ LED display on my desk, a favourite Das Keyboard at my fingertips, and I’m writing blog posts, poking around on Facebook. The difference is pretty clear to me: when I was in Yerevan and Berlin, I wanted to work, and now I don’t.
I won’t end with some hackneyed and nauseating Millenial “thought leadership” about “doing what you love”, nor the facile conclusion that it’s all in your head. I would just offer the modest speculation that an ounce of tweaks to the intellectual content of one’s work, or other, more existential life issues that inform your inner drive, is probably worth a pound of major adjustments to one’s office furniture, seating, barriers, and computer peripherals.
It’s wonderful to be back amidst the beautiful Alpine scenery of Innsbruck, and I’m overwhelmed by nostalgia. I was last here almost exactly twelve years ago, in 2003, when I was 17, for about two months during the summer before my senior year of high school.
This was before the era of smartphones and ubiquitous WiFi, and we had no Internet access in our rented apartment. I still had to use a real map, and had maybe an hour of Internet access a day. For the first time in many years, I learned to happily do without, and to go outside and enjoy life without anxiety about the torrent of news, information and opinion to which I was not privy.
My father got a rare and coveted opportunity to teach on a summer abroad programme for American students. Practically, classes would let out around noon on Thursday, and the weekend was ours for travelling; this way, I got to see Vienna, Rome, Florence, Berlin and Paris, generally connecting by train through München. The München-Innsbruck EC train got to feel something like a commute home by the end of it all.
But it was in Innsbruck itself that I got my first exposure to Western European life, and it did a lot to mellow me out of my teenage angst, in those times expressed through we might call “niche” intellectual and ideological fixations. In everyday life in Austria, waking up after dawn to behold this ring of spectacular mountains above and piles of unlocked bicycles below, I found my idea of “capitalism with a human face”. Its attachment to reality is a complex topic, but irrelevant; my teenage mind had learned to stop worrying and love the small things, love the petite bourgeoisie. Apart from a brief exposure to the Rockies, I had never been in mountainous settings. I had only known the stifling humidity and mugginess of the Eastern half of the US and never crisp, cool air. Last time I had seen vestiges of daylight at 10 PM was in the “white nights” of Riga when I was four–a last-hurrah holiday in 1990 preceding the secession of the Baltic Republics.
In many ways, my quotidian walks up and down Maria-Theresien-Straße, ventures west on Anichstraße to the Universität Innsbruck cafeteria for our included lunch of schnitzel, and my hikes to Hungerburg (868 m) did more for my spiritual health than the whirlwind of train travel.
I returned to America in August calmer, thinner, fitter and happier, with very concrete–for once, not theoretical–expansion of horizons. I had forgotten a lot of Spanish grammar just in time for the AP course, but had a bit of German up my sleeve.
My literature teacher from the previous semester asked, dejectedly, “Where is the angry communist Balashov?” I had no answer for him; I was in good spirits, and it was a great time to be alive.
It is challenging to make prognostications that are specific and testable, or, in the thinking of Karl Popper’s brand of empiricism, falsifiable. Many predictions are formulated such that they could be argued, post facto, to be true regardless of what actually happens.
I’ll try to avoid making those. At the same time, prognoses about complex phenomena like global economics and war are often, by their nature, vague and open to interpretation, and they consist of many parts. They are replete with statements about things that aren’t necessarily discrete or quantifiable. At best, they can be viewed as compositions, as systems of many interdependent propositions and variables which must be accepted or dismissed holistically. This is the insight of Thomas Kuhn, who found the Popperian view of how science evolves, through the testing of individual hypotheses, to be naive. He popularised the use of the word “paradigm”, a superset of a hypothesis. It may be that the apparent truth or falsehood of my predictions will depend on whether you buy into certain paradigms.
Without further ado:
1. The price of crude oil will rebound to US $80/bbl or more.
It’s not in the interest of any oil-producing nation to perpetuate the current freefall, which has led, at the time of this writing, to oil trading in the $50-$60/bbl range .
I’m not an industry analyst, but my impression is that the current slide is caused by a combination of:
- Reduced short-term global demand.
- Saudi Arabia breaking ranks with its OPEC cohorts and refusing to restrict output.
- Optimism about the increasing production of the American domestic energy sector (leading to expectations of higher supplies).
I don’t think Saudi Arabia going rogue is going to last. Saudi Arabia can weather low prices better than many rival oil autocracies, but ultimately, these states have common interests. Someone will probably make a deal with the Kingdom to encourage them to return to cartel discipline. The Russian economy suffers particularly heavily from a fall in oil, as its state budget depends almost entirely on high oil price targets, and it exports almost nothing apart from energy and raw materials. It’s possible that Russia, despite not being an OPEC member state, will offer some carrots to get the Saudis to cut output.
As for the optimism about American domestic energy supplies, there’s definitely an underlying reality: undeniably, output has increased profoundly in the last few years, to the extent that it may be one of the most significant structural changes of the early 21st century. But I would wager that some of the correspondent market movements can be attributed to irrational exuberance and speculative trading, too; once the sizzling party cools down and the fast rave music gives way to slower ballads, cracks will emerge, in the form of concerns about sustainability of yields (at certain EROEIs) and environmental impact of this boom. I don’t believe that short-term advances in hydraulic fracturing of shale change the big picture, which is that the EROEI of global hydrocarbon energy supplies is falling.
I hope that the current trend in increasing energy capture efficiency (and therefore EROEI) of photovoltaic cells and wind turbines, as well as ongoing research into hydrogen fuel cells, thorium reactors, and other alternative sources, will continue undistracted by short-term fossil fuel supply bumps. I’m not holding my breath for capital markets to get smart enough to emphasise long-term prospectus over short-term speculative opportunities, though. I’ve always thought that energy and environmental issues are key examples of market failure, alongside healthcare.
2. Russia will continue to be mildly depressed.
Most of Russia’s present economic malaise and inflation (50% devaluation of the rouble) probably owes itself more to the crash in crude oil prices than to any effect of Western sanctions, in the same way that Russia’s stabilisation in the 2000s owes itself to the rise in crude oil prices rather than Putin’s much-touted economic policies.
So, I think any recovery is likely to be linked to the oil. As I expect the gains in crude to be modest (to ~$80/bbl or so, rather than $100+), I don’t expect Russia to see a dramatic reversal in its current fortunes.
3. The Ukraine conflict will stagnate, unresolved.
There is neither political commitment nor opportunity for either the West or Russia to, as outside influences, drive the Ukraine conflict to any endgame. The only actor that has an incentive to take decisive action and definitively consolidate Ukraine is the Kiev government, but it does not have the military capability or finances to do that.
What I expect is that the current status quo will coalesce into a kind of uneasy détente, not wholly unlike the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008, where South Ossetia and Abkhazia became nominally independent and de facto Russian-controlled–and, at the very least, ungovernable for Georgia. This kind of situation has a tendency to ossify over time, unless some dramatic transpiration suddenly reanimates active conflict.
That is to say, the Russian-adhering Eastern Ukraine will continue to be a semi-ungovernable patchwork for the central government. Professional ‘rebels’ from the likes of the Donetsk People’s Republic will continue to carve out careers for themselves, and be variously, depending on what’s going on, nudged by half-hearted Ukranian army offensives, officially disavowed by Russia, or unofficially utilised by Russia as a tool to coerce Ukraine and the West (with the implicit threat of whipping up pro-Russian nationalist agitation among such groups). More generally, Eastern Ukraine will continue to run nominally as part of Ukranian territory, but with its fronds tending increasingly toward the Russian sun in terms of economic and political linkage.
This situation will, over time, reach some sort of equilibrium where nobody really “wins”, while everybody claims to have won and trades accusations of banditry. The world will forget about Ukraine and move on; Russian economic relations with the West will slowly and subtly renormalise, particularly with Europe, though the remnants of sanctions will continue to be used by the US to pressure Russia, while the instability of the East–with the implied influence that Russia has over it–will be used by Russia as leverage against the West. Both the US and Russia win in having an outside enemy to refer to, particularly the Putin regime, which will point to US sanctions as easy blame for ongoing internal malaise it cannot fix.
4. US-Iran relations will improve and the US will ease sanctions against Iran.
While some recent improvements in US-Iran relations can probably be attributed to the ascendance of more moderate post-Ahmadinejad forces, the more significant incentive for collaboration involves the common enemy of ISIS. It is likely that there will be some quiet, underplayed horse-trading and compromise regarding Iran’s nuclear programme in the service of this awkward alliance.
5. The ISIS-driven partition of Iraq will solidify.
With increasing US commitment to airstrikes against ISIS, which is also perceived as a regional threat by nearly all incumbent regimes, it seems likely that ISIS military gains will be arrested. On the other hand, another US ground war to decisively drive ISIS out of the territories they currently occupy does not seem politically possible.
This will probably lead to a hardening of existing boundaries between ISIS-controlled and non-ISIS-controlled Iraq. Small flare-ups will occur between ISIS and local governments who have more enthusiasm for driving them out decisively than the US does, such as the battle-hardened Peshmerga of Iraqi Kurdistan, though they will not succeed in doing so for lack of supplies and firepower. Other locals will probably come to an accommodation with ISIS, though this is something neither side will publicise because doing so is a losing proposition PR-wise (failure to defeat ISIS on one side, failure to comprehensively consolidate an Islamic caliphate on the other side).
6. The Syrian Civil War will continue without resolution or settlement.
This war will continue and inflict even more destruction upon an already destroyed and war-weary country.
In all likelihood, however, it will come to be increasingly simplified down to a pro vs. anti-ISIS conflict, especially since the American view is that any enemy of hard-line Islamists is its friend. Depending on the overall military successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, this may even lead to a delicate, understated thawing or rapprochement with the Assad regime, though neither side will publicise this fact because it’s a lose-lose PR proposition.
7. Chinese (PRC) growth will continue to plateau.
As China undergoes industrialisation without a clear next step beyond its specialisation in manufacturing, its GDP growth will continue to plateau. Combined with a possible pop in its overheated urban real estate market, this may lead to a mild recession.
8. China will become an increasingly attractive IT outsourcing destination over India.
As a result of its growth and increasing (though very unequally distributed) affluence, India has become too expensive for many Western firms’ tastes, and they will increasingly look to China to fill the gap, particularly in low-skill business process outsourcing and backoffice functions. But this in itself is unlikely to be China’s ticket out of a looming existential crisis of macroeconomic purpose.
9. The West African Ebola epidemic will peak and fade from public view.
The West African Ebola epidemic is currently projected to peak in April or May of 2015 by the WHO. After that, it will probably fade from public view entirely, punctuated by the occasional incident of an infected individual making it across Western borders.
10. Pope Francis will face political challenges from conservative hardliners.
It is unlikely that Pope Francis’ spate of rapid and theologically radical liberal reforms will be allowed to continue forever by the conservatives within the Vatican inner circles and conservative bishops elsewhere. Such conflicts have already flared up, and thus far, the Pontiff has prevailed.
Canon law has no procedure to impeach or recall a pope. I don’t think his job is in danger. His influence over certain conservative constituencies and their local directors will probably be reduced in increasingly conspicuous acts of defiance, though.
11. The global appreciation of the US Dollar will end.
The increased dollar demand is most likely due to:
- The Federal Reserve is nearing the end of its most recent period of Quantitative Easing (QE), which is expected to pull back money supply.
- The high performance of the S&P 500 spectrum of the US stock market.
- Exuberance about American energy supplies and perceived domestic recovery in jobs and real estate.
- Increased demand for hard reserve currency in places with high inflation, such as Russia and many of the former Soviet republics (whose currencies’ fate is, in many instances, closely linked to the rouble).
I think this exuberant climate will cool by the end of 2015Q2 and that former-USSR inflation will stabilise in tandem with rebounding oil prices. The stock market is thought to be in need of a correction phase. These things will send the dollar back down to historical norms.
For most Armenian immigrants to the US, it is quite likely that American life offers a higher material standard of living and more access to vastly greater opportunities. If that weren’t broadly true, people wouldn’t emigrate there. It is no less true that the relative poverty and ongoing demographic implosion of Armenia can be crushing, and that daily life there for a great many people is closer to the problems of basic survival than the life of most Americans. That’s fairly self-evident.
Still, from the year and a half that I’ve spent in Armenia, if I had a 10 dram coin for every time I’ve heard from native Armenians that America is the promised land of high dollars and low worries, or that I’ve heard righteously indignant gripes about stingy relatives in the US who “only” send a few hundred dollars in monthly remittance, or “you’re American, what’s a hundred dollars to you?”, or (my favourite) “isn’t everything cheaper in America?”, I’d be a billionaire (in dollars). I could get my own faux Sphinx, or Egyptian pyramid, or something on a highway on the outskirts of Yerevan.
As a first-generation immigrant to the US, and an experienced traveler to the so-called “developing world”, I’d like to address some of the myths held by Armenians, be it that life in the US is convenient and comfortable, or that their US-side relatives, with the pocket change they send back to tatik, have crossed to the dark side of unconscienable avarice and forgotten the meaning of family.
I’m not passing judgement on whether anyone should emigrate. However, if you’re going to try to emigrate, it’s better to do it with some realism about what to expect, and some appreciation for the complexity encountered in trying to make meaningful comparisons between life there and life back home. Like many people, Armenians have a tendency to compare the worst aspects of life in Armenia with the best aspects of life in America, or elsewhere abroad. Yes, being young, healthy and rich in America is better than being poor, sick and aging in Armenia, no doubt. But it’s not an accurate or reasonable comparison.
Mind you, this is not some myopic apologia full of First World Problems, to tell native Armenians how hard life is for us in one of the world’s richest countries. I’m not here to share the horror of a broken espresso machine or Banana Republic being out of khakis (with apologies to George Carlin). You can put the world’s tiniest violin away.
The US has always done an excellent job of marketing itself as the promised land, and the global reach of its mass-cultural and media exports to support that narrative is unrivaled. So, I don’t really need to tell you what is potentially good about it. Instead, I’ll speak to the more ambiguous notes.
Jobs and immigration
If you’re not earning well in Armenia because you don’t have any specialised skills or education, you’re going to face the same problem anywhere else; wages for unskilled labour are low everywhere.
As hundreds of thousands of Armenian migrant workers in Russia know, a blue-collar labourers can still fetch superior (relative to Armenia) wages during boom times, particularly in construction and industrial labour. However, this is not a realistic vehicle for emigration to the US for two reasons:
- The criteria for immigration: the US has plenty of unskilled manual labourers, both domestic and immigrant (legal and illegal). It has absolutely no incentive to let any more of them in, and US employers can’t sponsor a pair of hands and a strong back for a visa.
- The sheer expense of life in the US, where a great deal of costs, such as healthcare, are borne directly by the consumer. Some of these are covered at least rudimentarily by state infrastructure or held down by free-market pricing elsewhere. In other words, I would contend that earning little in the US by US standards can be riskier and more problematic than earning little by Russian or Armenian standards in Russia or Armenia. We’ll return to that topic later.
Russia has a (somewhat) common market with Armenia and is politically motivated to offer an inclusive attitude to CIS guest workers. This is not so for the US.
Some Armenians I’ve met seem to be under the impression that if they just had an axperes in California that could hook them up with a job at his auto shop, the visa and immigration issues will solve themselves. This is completely false. While knowing people and having connections is useful anywhere, overall the US economy, along with its immigration system, are fairly transparent and follow the law strictly. Moreover, it is important to remember that the US is very large, very diverse, and not run by Armenians–who represent a tiny and insignificant minority. Nobody there can just “arrange” it all for you unless you meet official immigration criteria. It doesn’t work like that.
If you’re a highly skilled, educated professional, presumably you have or will attempt to solve this problem in advance of emigrating, and you might be successful. Even so, there are a few things to keep in mind. Armenians specialise highly in urbane intellectualism and their diaspora has a high proportion of academics. This should not be confused with a high availability of academic jobs, especially in the liberal arts and humanities. Funding for that sort of thing is quite slim by developed-world standards. While professors are generally compensated well in the US, the number of available tenure-track positions, or even full-time instructorships, is small and shrinking.
The cost-saving approach of American universities is not so much to pay professors little as it is to eliminate their positions and replace them with part-time graduate teaching assistants and part-time instructors–expendable armies of people who are paid measly wages (effectively below minimum wage) a la carte (by the course), with no job security or benefits.
Competition, and the harsh office politics that come with it, is formidable, because even in this sweatshop atmosphere, graduate students need teaching hours. Your formal credentials may not carry over to the American system, which means you’ll be disadvantaged in competing with 26-year old second-year graduate students for the opportunity to provide essentially free labour to this system.
In the large public university that I attended, easily 80% of my courses were taught by graduate students not much older than I was. Needless to say, teaching quality is not a major preoccupation of the American university system.
That’s all to say that I wouldn’t count on an academic route in. It’s not impossible; in fact, it’s the one my parents took. But they had to step down from top-tier Moscow professorships to repeat graduate school for six years, then beat very low job market and employer sponsorship odds to stay. I wouldn’t have bet on us. We just got lucky. A lot of it probably owes itself to the unique boom times of the nineties.
Objectively speaking, the people in the best position to emigrate to the US, with employer sponsorship, are probably highly-skilled professionals in the private sector. Even so, the quotas on H1B visas are highly restrictive. In the tech sector, at least, there is widespread agreement that the part of the US immigration system that deals with legal immigration of high-skill professionals is in badly in need of reform.
The costs of life
It’s fairly obvious that the absolute cost of living in the US, and in Western countries in general, is higher than in Armenia. Native Armenians recognise this in abstract, but many seem to lack the perspective to apply that knowledge concretely to any given situation.
Let’s say an Armenian family of three or four gets by in Yerevan, somehow, on roughly US$900/mo. They hear that their cousin and his wife in Fresno pull in a household income of US$95,000 (roughly US$7900/mo). So, they figure, “How much more expensive could it be? Twice? Three times? How stingy do you have to be to only send back $300 every month while we’re working twelve hours a day, six days per week, to make ends meet with $900?” It seems to be human nature to figure: “If I had that kind of money, I’d find a way. How expensive could it be?”
That’s because, at some level, most people think that if they can get by on $900, then anything over that–or at least half of anything over that–is, in some shape or form, “extra” or “disposable”, even taking into account the theoretical recognition of higher living costs. The higher costs don’t concretely register, mostly because people don’t know what they are.
Cost of living differential is a fluid concept that presents in many different forms. First, there are the exact same or substantially similar things, but which simply cost more in, say, Fresno–maybe a little more, maybe a lot more. Then, there are the things that are of the same category but are qualitatively incommensurable in some way, so it’s difficult to meaningfully compare their price. There are also things that are free or close to free in Armenia but cost money in the States. As well, there are substantial differences in anticipated risk and statistical incidence of certain expenses.
The point is, one cannot simply compare prices straight across. It is important to holistically understand the overall differences in the available lifestyle options, as well as the categories of expenditures that are structurally, legally or culturally particular to the respective locales. In many cases, they are very specific to the exact socioeconomic terms of a given place. In other words, you’re not going to buy the same things in the US that you do in Yerevan; they’ll neither be the same products or services, nor identical categories of outlays. It’s not intelligible to conceptualise a monthly budget in Fresno in everyday Yerevan terms, though that doesn’t stop many people from doing exactly that.
I don’t know who seeded this meme that Americans pay low taxes. I’ve heard it repeated a number of times in casual conversations with Armenians.
Average American salary and wage employees pay a tax rate that is typical of the developed world, and is fairly comparable, in the aggregate, to the 35-45% that most Western Europeans pay, though, of course, that varies by country. A rigourous comparative analysis of international taxation could easily consume a whole dissertation in itself, and I don’t have data handy. In some respects, US taxes are indeed lower than European ones: marginal tax rates are unquestionably much lower. On the other hand, marginal US corporate income tax rates are some of the highest in the developed world.
The main difference is that the US is, by “First World” standards, very jurisdictionally fragmented, owing to its unique fixation with federalism. The aggregate individual tax burden in the US doesn’t come from one national-level tax authority. There are several different kinds of federal taxes, all assessed at different rates, limits and progressive brackets. There are state-level income taxes. Some counties (administrative divisions of states) have special income taxes. Some cities, such as New York City, have municipal income taxes. In addition to that, there are sales taxes (varying by county and state), property taxes (a very substantial source of local government funding), excise taxes, and gasoline taxes, and for business owners and self-employed individuals, a variety of other kinds of taxes. Most of these are assessed in a complex cascade by a zoo of separate agencies at the state, federal and municipal level, all with their own rules, forms, courts, collection practices, and so on. It’s all quite Byzantine.
This fragmentation makes it difficult to add up one’s aggregate tax burden, but if one does, one will find that it’s not substantially out of line with Western Europe. The difference is that the Western European taxpayer receives an abundance of social benefits and subsidies for it. In the US, there is no free healthcare, free university education, or free housing. From that point of view, the US is one of the most expensive jurisdictions in the “First World”; you have to pay both sides!
It’s virtually impossible to compute exactly how much our hypothetical Fresno family earning $95,000 will pay in taxes, because nobody pays the same amount in taxes. It greatly depends on whether they file jointly or separately, whether they have children, and if so, how many, and many other factors. California state income tax is deductible from the federal taxable income, and so on, but not from the 7.5% that they contribute toward federal payroll taxes (Medicare & Social Security). Without running all those numbers, together with the particulars of their withholding allowances, it’s not easy to arrive at a figure. Nevertheless, a very rough estimation for a single individual making $95,000 and filing as single in California puts total tax at around $33,000, or roughly 35%. This, of course, is just state and federal taxes, and does not include local sales tax (which, in California, varies from 7.5% to 10%), nor any possible property taxes, vehicle registration taxes, and a variety of other taxes that, when added up, will certainly push the tax burden past 40%.
But even with our 35% figure, you can expect take-home income off $95,000 to drop to $62,000 or so, which is not so much $7900/mo as $5100/mo. Not a small difference! It is certainly not outside the realm of possibility for one to pay close to half one’s income in taxes. For a variety of reasons related to the intricacies of tax codes at a variety of levels, most Americans don’t end up paying quite that much, but a lot of the professional middle class comes close. The point is: don’t jump to conclusions from sensational, eye-popping gross figures.
Housing, real estate and rents
According to the US Census Bureau, 2013 Median Gross Rent in 2013 was US $905. That may not seem like so much, but that’s a median across the country as a whole.
However, the US is a very large and decentralised country, and there are plenty of inexpensive rural areas, as well as blighted post-industrial places, where housing is cheap. That doesn’t mean you want to live there. The jobs are fewer and the incomes are lower, too.
All in all, I think a little Googling will persuade one that housing in the kinds of places where most Armenians would want to live and seem to agglomerate, e.g. southern California, is a matter of at least $1200/mo, and very possibly closer to $2000/mo or beyond.
Armenians, like other ex-Soviet people, are in a globally unique position of benefiting from the privatisation of real estate after the collapse of the USSR. Simply, if you had an apartment at the time the USSR dissolved, you got to keep it; it was gifted to you as private property. It became a source of wealth on which many people rely. It is common for Armenians to own the home in which they live, even if they are likely to be living there with extended family. The fact that most of them don’t have a mortgage or rent to pay explains how they can get by on such low wages.
The fact is, if you have an apartment in Yerevan, you’ve got a roof. It may not be a good roof, but it’s a roof. You can rent it out to other people, as many do to supplement their monthly income. It may not be much, but it’s something. Other Soviet people benefited from privatisation much more; people fortunate enough to own Moscow apartments genuinely came to sit on some wealth, both from rental and liquidation.
Armenians are sometimes under the impression that lots of Americans own houses, too. This is a misapprehension; Very few Americans own homes free and clear. Lots of Americans have purchased financed houses, usually on 15 or 30-year mortgage loan terms. While the interest rates are low by present-day Armenian standards, the post-recessionary credit environment has contracted and it has become harder to get a mortgage.
The point is that almost all Americans pay rent or a mortgage in order to have a roof. It’s usually their biggest expense, and frequently a large proportion of their income. The processes of civil law operate quite expediently; if you don’t pay, you will be evicted, or your home will be repossessed by the bank and auctioned off. This is something that many Armenians are unaccustomed to considering, since a good many of them live in apartments inherited through post-Soviet privatisation and/or through family.
Credit and debt is a way of life in America, especially for big-ticket items. Few homes or cars are bought in cash. That may seem like a good thing–it makes things more affordable and at more realistic rates than in Armenia. However, as with any leverage, prices rose to reflect the widespread availability of credit (a consequence that monetary stimulus policy relies upon), which means most people need credit to buy things that they could not conceivably afford in cash. For quite some time now, credit has not been merely a tool to make it easier to afford some things, but rather the only means of obtaining them at all for average-earning people. That means that unless you become wealthy by American standards, you might be able to buy a house, and if you do, you’ll be in enormous debt for what is, by most people’s standards, a close-enough approximation of forever. You can sell a house to get out of that obligation, but clearing what you owe the bank is your problem and your risk. The recent housing recession should serve to remind that housing is not such a dependable store of wealth.
Many would say that against the background of the state of the Armenian economy, it is an enviable luxury to even be in a position to contemplate optimal stores of wealth or weigh the downsides of credit, as a member of a sizable middle class. I don’t disagree. The point of this article is not to convince you that, from a material point of view, life in the US is as bad or worse than life in Armenia. Instead, I want to put emphasis on things that are typically underemphasised by starry-eyed aspiring emigrants who imagine life abroad to be a panacea. Life in wealthier countries brings problems and stresses of its own.
Among Armenians’ chief complaints is the high cost of healthcare relative to local incomes, and understandably so–it’s high. Nevertheless, Armenia has a largely free market in healthcare; payments are direct from patient to medical provider, and so prices are constrained by what the market will directly bear. Healthcare is a price-inelastic service, and so the prices the market will bear–grudgingly–are quite high. Nevertheless, there is a quantitative limit to the madness.
I don’t think any immigrant to the US can be fully prepared for the disaster that is the healthcare system. Simply put, it has neither the virtues of prices held down by supply and demand, nor the virtues of a state-operated or single-payer socialised healthcare model that predominates in Western Europe and elsewhere in the developed world. Instead, the US has managed to achieve the worst of all worlds: all downsides, no upside. Astounding inflation in the market is caused by the distortions of an intermediate bureaucracy of private insurers, rendering it ipso facto unaffordable without insurance. At the same time, the system is highly inefficient, having the highest proportion of medical expenditures going to nonmedical purposes (e.g. administration, marketing, legal costs) in the developed world.
Most nontrivial medical procedures and hospitalisations cost tens of thousands of dollars. A serious illness will incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical billing, and very serious illnesses likely well into the millions. If you’re fortunate enough to have a health insurance policy through your employer, which is the normal mechanism for obtaining health insurance in the US, these fees are billed to your insurer, who will do anything they can to get out of paying the claim. The Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) reforms have seemingly put an end to the most audaciously hostile aspects of this (huge departments in every insurance company dedicated to finding “preexisting conditions” on the basis of which to reject your claim, leaving you responsible for the fees), but it remains to be seen whether these reforms will survive future legal challenges by conservative (i.e. pro-big business) political forces.
Plenty of other caveats that can lead to your insurance claim being rejected remain, the main one at this point being that insurers typically will cover what they consider to be medically necessary, which is often the bare minimum of indicated treatment. Anything beyond that is “elective” (a.k.a. superfluous and unnecessary) and they are not obligated to cover it. It’s true that any system with cost controls imposed by a third party, such as state-operated socialised healthcare systems in Europe, must limit what medical providers will do for a patient in a given scenario. However, I think you’ll find that in the US, the resulting mixture is especially perverse; very often, unnecessary procedures and tests (which pad doctors’ pockets) are easily approved, while procedures that would be deemed medically essential elsewhere are treated as elective and denied.
Regardless of whether you have insurance, you will share in these inflated costs. The sharing doesn’t end with high premiums (which have gotten significantly higher since the ACA came about), but also a maze of other mechanisms insurers use to defray some of their financial risk directly onto you (but on the cost basis of the severe inflation they themselves helped create): deductibles, copays and coinsurance ratios, which vary considerably with type of medical service or procedure.
Simply having insurance by itself means little; it all depends on what kind of insurance. The vast majority of Americans do have private health insurance of some sort, yet 60% is a well-accepted figure for the percentage of personal bankruptcies attributable to medical bills.
Analysis of the myriad of pathologies of the American healthcare system would take a lengthy book. Once upon a time, insurance was–as most insurance is in any other sphere–for low-probability, high-magnitude catastrophic events only. Over time, it seems to have evolved into a payment gateway for all medical procedures, period, including the most routine care. Along with a panoply of other factors, such as the absence of heavyhanded government price controls or regulation of the business side of healthcare, this enabled enormous inflation, since insurance spreads the cost around.
The economic aspect important for the potential immigrant to realise is that the only people in the US that have access to good healthcare they can afford are:
- Affluent white-collar professionals working for large private companies that provide generous nonsalary benefits;
- Employees in the government sector (state or federal);
- Those fortunate enough to work in unionised professions (far less common in the US than in many other developed countries, and varies highly by region) who happen to have negotiated good benefits;
- People over 65 years of age, who receive Medicare (ironically, very functional socialised healthcare);
- Very low-income people who meet stringent criteria for Medicaid;
- Military veterans;
- Miscellaneous wealthy or semi-wealthy individuals.
Most of the American public does not fit into these categories, and this includes many people you would be moved to otherwise describe as middle class. Statistically speaking, medical bills will probably be a problem for you, too.
Yes, I know that the comparatively “inexpensive” medicine in Armenia is equally unaffordable to a population whose median monthly wage is just under US$300. Nevertheless, I would contend that there’s something to be said for owing hundreds or thousands of dollars rather than a quarter million–a very real concern in a place where a short ambulance ride can cost nearly US $2000. American healthcare bills are not in sums you can somehow borrow from family or friends. I suspect one reason why the TV series Breaking Bad had such uptake is that it resonated with a lot of people. It’s not such a stretch for most Americans to imagine that running a methamphetamine drug empire would be the only way for an ordinary schoolteacher to afford treatment of his lung cancer and ensure his family’s financial security.
Suburbia, layout, and transportation
The US economy is highly decentralised and has an excellent roadway network for distribution. Outside of a few older cities such as New York, it is mostly laid out in a monotonous, low-density, suburban architectural pattern. The vast majority of the American population lives in a landscape consisting of freestanding houses, roadways, and utilitarian shopping areas with large parking lots. Because the density is low, the driving distances are quite typically rather high. Americans spend more time commuting to work than almost anyone on Earth. In many places, there are no foot paths, and in many other places where they do exist, they are a strict formality, with nary a pedestrian in sight. One could not be blamed for coming away with the impression that cars are first-class objects on the American terra firma, while pedestrians are distinctly second.
You might think I’m describing the countryside and rural areas, but no. In fact, this is all true even in places that nominally market themselves as “cities”. All of the major growing “cities” of the Sun Belt, such as Dallas, Phoenix, Houston, Los Angeles, Atlanta and Miami, which developed in the postwar automobile boom, are in fact little more than vast agglomerations of bland suburban tract, separated by vast lengths of highway. Sometimes they’re wrapped around a small, central urban core, but in most cases that’s just a small financial district, or a depressed post-industrial nexus of economic decay. Either way, most of the population doesn’t live there, and these cores are neither a central feature of American aspirations nor of life in this country.
This has certain upsides. It theory, it allows one to feel as if one lives in the peaceful retreat of the countryside while having the amenities of a nearby conurbation. This might seem like a refreshing prospect to someone who has lived amidst the constant din and crowds of Yerevan their entire life.
The decentralised infrastructure and penetrating roadway network required to support this also gives rise to equalisation and homogeneity. The material level of life in Evergreen, Alabama isn’t really that different from life in New York City. Sure, it’s definitely different, but the differences are mostly a matter of small nuances. Broadly, you have access to essentially the same supply chains of commoditised groceries, fuel, medicine and services in the countryside as you do in a megapolis. This is rather different from most of the rest of the world, including Armenia, where everyone knows there’s Yerevan, and there’s not-Yerevan, and the developmental chasm between them can sometimes seem to be almost be measurable in centuries, depending on where exactly you go. Much of the US is very homogenous in both practical and aesthetic terms. You’ll have to come to New York for world-class neurosurgery, but you can drive on good roads, go bowling, and go to the same supermarket and buy the same Cheetos pretty much anywhere, even in the tiniest hamlet.
So, people are always surprised when I lean on this aspect of the US critically, as a primary reason for low quality of life. It’s a topic that receives so little attention it may as well be categorised as “a problem that has no name”. The reality, however, is that the impact of this way of designing the world goes far beyond mere aesthestics–which, by the way, are terrible; the suburban landscape is unrivaled in its monotony and depressing blandness. The problem is more insidious, though; the way that we build our settlements has deep implications for our civic life, our communities, our patterns of interaction, the relationships we form, the company we keep, and ultimately, the purpose and meaning we find in our lives.
Much of the rest of the world takes for granted architectural principles of how to build life-affirming human settlements. These principles evolved over thousands of years, and it’s no accident that so many cultures reached the same conclusions. Urban Europeans, and indeed Armenians, are accustomed to vertical growth, mixed-use development (shops on first floor, apartments above), sidewalks, plazas, public squares and street cafes. These are the fixtures amidst which your halcyon childhood days played out, where you walked hand in hand with your first love, where you met friends for coffee, and hopped the train to work. It’s the corner with the pastry shop, it’s the supermarket down the street, and the bench in between.
Few people can prepare themselves for the degree to which Americans have, in the last half-century or so, taken this entire corpus of human experience and thrown it completely into the trash, with the exception of a few older cities–not the places where the majority of Americans live. What has replaced it is a surreal moonscape. For those accustomed to the traditional urban civilisation, the primary question in America is: where do I go? What do I do? Looking around leads to an intangible but intense realisation of emptiness. Suburbia is both a cause and an effect of the destruction of civic and community life in America: there’s increasingly little to come home to, and vanishingly little to go out to. This has real effects. Your children will have nowhere to play, as there is no courtyard full of friends; they will depend on your willingness to drive them (sometimes quite far) for prearranged “play dates”. You will not take leisurely strolls to admire the scenery, for there is neither admirable scenery nor anywhere to stroll. It’s likely that you won’t even know your neighbours. You certainly can’t venture downstairs for lettuce or milk; strict zoning codes have ensured that only residential structures can be built where you live, and you’ll have to drive a few miles to reach the commercial zone, where the grocery stores are.
The architect James Howard Kunstler does a good job of anatomising the essential problems of suburbia in this TED talk. I don’t necessarily share all of his ideological accents, but I think he’s summed up the general problem very nicely. The thing you have to realise when watching that video is that he’s not talking about a particular kind of neighbourhood; he’s talking about the overwhelming majority of the US, including places others are accustomed to thinking of as cities. Dallas, for instance, is not a city by the global standards. Much of it should probably be reclassified as a rural area.
In this atmosphere, the almighty car–still a matter of social status, prestige and perceived convenience in Armenia–falls from grace. It’s no longer a luxurious way to thumb your nose at the teeming masses. You are one of the teeming masses. A lot of your energy and money and will go toward the purchase and upkeep of a rapidly depreciating hunk of metal in which you will spend a significant fraction of your life, all alone. It’s only cool when most people don’t have one; when four wheels have replaced two feet, it’s just a needlessly expensive way to traverse pointlessly large distances of identical-looking road for unclear reasons.
It should go without saying that public transportation doesn’t exist in the US–at least, not by European standards. Unless you live in New York City, or well within the centres of Chicago or one or two other cities, you’ll need a car, and you’ll be spending a lot of time in it. Guaranteed.
For a culture as warm and sociable as that of Armenians, this is all anathema. Truly committed people can maintain friendships and connections across the most hostile landscapes, but so much of how we meet and relate to others is inextricably bound up in the convenience and opportunity in how we are situated. Physical layout cannot, by itself, either make one friends or hinder those who are determined to have them anyway. But it does matter. A lot.
Therefore, I’m moved to say that one of the most important things about the US is that it’s lonely. They built it that way.
No list of American peculiarities can be complete without due mention of its legal system.
The US is not the only country to have a Byzantine legal code or statutes both complex and numerous, although both of those things are certainly true. Compared to the rest of the developed world, the US criminal justice system is harsh and metes out severe sentences. It often seems to have more punitive than rehabilitative aims, and this is, in general, politically rewarded, fed by intense “get tough on crime” populism. It’s aggravated by what might be described as a “prison-industrial complex” of legislative machinery and lobbying–one that extends to and encapsulates vested law enforcement institutions. It is a major contributor to the result that the US has the highest incarceration rate in the world. Not the developed world. The whole world.
In addition, there are some eccentricities of Anglo-American common law that people coming from a CIS legal system are sure to find bewildering. One is the enormous amount of personal discretion that is afforded to prosecutors and other individual actors in a criminal case. In many other countries, there are statutes that clearly outline the process a state prosecutor must follow. In the US, a lot more depends on the whims of the concrete personalities involved.
For instance, over 90% of American criminal cases are settled by “plea bargaining”, a technique where the accused and the prosecutor make a deal to exchange the accused’s guilty plea for reduced charges. That is to say, the prosecution is allowed to literally change the accusation being made from the same body of evidence: “Instead of felony armed robbery, we are going to charge you with a misdemeanour of ‘disturbing the peace’.” The official argument for this practice is that it saves public resources by avoiding the expense and complexity of a trial.
Naturally, this flexibility leads to inflated charges that the prosecution cannot support in a real trial. The prosecution gambles that the defendant will be intimidated by the worst-case possibility of conviction for grandiose charges, and will settle for the certainty of conviction on lesser charges over the uncertainty of conviction on bigger ones. The prosecution gets a higher conviction rate, which is politically beneficial. The effect is class-discriminatory: well-heeled defendants who can afford good legal representation, post a bail-bond and have time on their hands will fight the prosecution, while poorer defendants will fold and settle.
By American lights, this passes for justice, which leads to a larger and more important point: the US criminal justice system is overwhelmingly preoccupied with procedure and process, often at the expense of justice. This myopia is the product of a technocratic bureaucracy. It’s summed up nicely in a New Yorker article called “The Caging of America”:
William J. Stuntz, a professor at Harvard Law School who died shortly before his masterwork, “The Collapse of American Criminal Justice,” was published, last fall, is the most forceful advocate for the view that the scandal of our prisons derives from the Enlightenment-era, “procedural” nature of American justice. He runs through the immediate causes of the incarceration epidemic: the growth of post-Rockefeller drug laws, which punished minor drug offenses with major prison time; “zero tolerance” policing, which added to the group; mandatory-sentencing laws, which prevented judges from exercising judgment. But his search for the ultimate cause leads deeper, all the way to the Bill of Rights. In a society where Constitution worship is still a requisite on right and left alike, Stuntz startlingly suggests that the Bill of Rights is a terrible document with which to start a justice system—much inferior to the exactly contemporary French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which Jefferson, he points out, may have helped shape while his protégé Madison was writing ours.
The trouble with the Bill of Rights, he argues, is that it emphasizes process and procedure rather than principles. The Declaration of the Rights of Man says, Be just! The Bill of Rights says, Be fair! Instead of announcing general principles—no one should be accused of something that wasn’t a crime when he did it; cruel punishments are always wrong; the goal of justice is, above all, that justice be done—it talks procedurally. You can’t search someone without a reason; you can’t accuse him without allowing him to see the evidence; and so on. This emphasis, Stuntz thinks, has led to the current mess, where accused criminals get laboriously articulated protection against procedural errors and no protection at all against outrageous and obvious violations of simple justice. You can get off if the cops looked in the wrong car with the wrong warrant when they found your joint, but you have no recourse if owning the joint gets you locked up for life. You may be spared the death penalty if you can show a problem with your appointed defender, but it is much harder if there is merely enormous accumulated evidence that you weren’t guilty in the first place and the jury got it wrong.
Plenty of immigrants inadvertently get into legal trouble in the US because they fail to realise how much the system is focused on the correctness of process rather than the holistic propriety–and indeed, the humanity–of the outcome. Such concerns are far too “interpretive” to enter into anyone’s mind. The contemporary incarnation of the peculiar mindset of Anglo-American jurisprudence leads to the question, “Were the rights of all parties, as enumerated by the law, protected?”, eclipsing the much larger issue: “Is this outcome compatible with justice?”
For instance, I have known Soviet immigrants who got into serious legal problems because of family and child custody-related problems. In one case, a mother was prosecuted with felony kidnapping for taking her child from a husband who himself had fled with the child, and who obviously had malevolent motives and committed extensive fraud. Common sense should say that she had understandable reasons for doing that. The American system says she interfered with a custody order (that he had supposedly obtained somewhere) and thus committed kidnapping.
In the graduate family housing community where I grew up, I seemed to have been one of few ex-Soviet children whose parents somehow avoided charges of child neglect. All of our parents were busy graduate students who worked all day and all night, and none of them knew that in the State of Indiana, it is illegal to leave a child under 12 years old home alone. In our home countries, schoolchildren of single-digit age routinely commuted to and from school alone. We were in a safe, enclosed community with an abundance of constant adult supervision from stay-at-home mothers; common sense should say that this is not child neglect, in that the parents’ intentions were not negligent, and us latchkey kids were not, in fact, being neglected. The authorities were not concerned with that; leaving a child under 12 home alone meets the statutory definition of child neglect, therefore it’s child neglect–end of story. There was no allowance for mitigating factors.
I don’t think this rigidity should be confused with effectiveness or precision. It’s not the same as a Germanic fastidiousness for law and order or attention to detail. German courts still consider the issue of whether a verdict and a sentence is consistent with the spirit or intent of the law. One of the key functions of a judge is to interpret that in a given scenario. American authorities are zealously preoccupied with much more narrow concerns of definition, execution and enforcement.
This shows up in civil law as well. The US is probably the most litigious society on the planet, leading to rather mechanistic approaches to the assignment of liability and risk. You’ll find yourself signing a lot of disclaimers, releases and waivers of liability for things that offend all sentient reason, and you’ll find yourself needing to take peculiar and cumbersome steps to ensure that you yourself are held harmless and indemnified in a variety of scenarios you would not have customarily assumed yourself to carry liability for. McDonald’s Corporation really can be held liable if you spill hot coffee on yourself, and maybe that’s good, but if you employ a mechanic and he spills hot coffee on himself while on the job, you might be held liable. Is that as strange as it sounds?
Social safety net and state services (or lack thereof)
For paying essentially similar tax rates to Western Europeans, Americans do not receive many state benefits, nor are able to rely on a substantial social safety net.
On the whole, the American body politic is chlorerically opposed to perceived “socialism”. This means that extensive taxpayer-funded social benefits are an impossible political sell in one of the richest countries on the globe.
This means that in many cases, you pay (at least) double; you both pay relatively high taxes, and pay out of your own pocket for things you wouldn’t have to pay for in Western Europe and many other developed countries. Healthcare is the most obvious and dire example, as I discussed above, but the same is largely true of child care, housing, university education, and, despite the existence of Social Security, pension.
There do exist unemployment benefits, disability benefits and government income assistance schemes to the very poor. The problem is rather that these programs provide very little compared to most developed-world countries, and are very limited in scope.
For instance, Armenians sometimes scoff at Americans for delaying having children until their thirties. Notwithstanding cultural causes, it’s worth noting that the expense of child care is expected to be shouldered by working parents themselves. The government does not provide, at a large scale, any sort of preschool or daycare, as is the case in many other developed countries. These services are available in private form, but are quite expensive, often so expensive as to substantially offset the income realised from liberating a parent to work. Quality cannot be counted upon; many of the cheaper daycare centres are little more than holding pens or warehouses for children, performing little to no useful pedagogical function.
Private university can cost tens of thousands of dollars annually in tuition. Public universities can be considerably cheaper, but the price is still well into the five figures once total cost of attendance, including boarding and meals, is considered. Some scholarships and financial aid from the universities is available, but not enough to realistically provide most students a way to afford attendance. The actual way most American university students afford university is by going into enormous debt, in the form of semi-government-sponsored student loans. It’s not uncommon to pay these loans back for the rest of one’s life, and they are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. All in all, American students owe $1.2 trillion dollars in student loans, and the average debt is $26000.
My home state of Georgia is rare in that it offers a rather novel form of state scholarship for state residents to attend public university in Georgia. The HOPE scholarship waives tuition if one qualifies on the basis of high school marks. How is it funded? Through state lottery ticket sales. It’s an upward income redistribution scheme; most buyers of lottery tickets are relatively poor and uneducated, and most recipients of the HOPE scholarship are middle-class kids from relatively affluent households. Because HOPE is awarded on the basis of academic performance, income is not a factor. This is a barometer of what is politically possible in America: upward income redistribution is okay, but to even imagine that the state itself could fund tuition directly? That would be socialism!
Federal housing aid for the very poor does exist, in the form of so-called Section 8 housing. But Section 8 housing is not somewhere you’d want to live unless you like gunshots and heroin needles.
Social Security was created in the 1930s to provide income security in old age. It is a mandatory government pension scheme. However, one would be crazy to rely on Social Security income alone in retirement; the payouts are quite low relative to contributions, which means that for most people, it’s not enough to live on. It should not be confused for an actual pension. Moreover, there are some unsettling questions about the long-term solvency of the fund.
Mandatory paid holiday in the US, where it exists, is limited to two weeks per year, and applies only to full-time, salaried employees. A great deal of employment in the US is in the form of part-time work, where the employer is not required to provide this or most other benefits. It is increasingly combined with paid illness time.
Bottom line: for their ~40%, the Europeans get more. A lot more.
The Anglo-American cultural heritage is uniquely individualistic.
This may be a welcome respite to Armenian denizens who are weary from a lifetime of collective social responsibilities and living for the concerns of others, and who may be eager for some privacy and freedom from gossip and judgement.
My experience has been that the other side of this can lead to a lot of culture shock. With due recognition to the fact that the US is diverse and has many subcultures, including very close-knit ones, it’s fair to say that the American ethos is decidedly more self-centred. The prevailing cultural expectation is that most people will take care of themselves and keep to themselves, and avoid being a burden to others in any way.
As I said above, there’s a lot to appreciate about this. But it also means that the concern you are accustomed to feeling from others for your well-being will fall off sharply. You can’t just take for granted that you can go ask your neighbour for a favour without a second thought; if you don’t know them well, it would be unseemly. In my personal experience, some Americans have even been known to respond in a hostile fashion to strangers knocking on their door. “Trespassing” and “privacy” are terms that get thrown around often.
I’m not saying that Americans are uncaring or unaffectionate people, by the way. It’s hard to make that generalisation about over 300 million people. Some of them are very caring. I’m just saying that if you are found to have signs of a meningioma and go in for an MRI scan, you might expect eight to ten friends and relatives to take time off work to show up with you and weep in anticipation in the waiting room. You will not find that here, and you’ll feel a sharp crash and withdrawal.
By and large, you are expected to take care of your own personal business in America and to “manage” your emotions and not allow them to interfere with your work. The inability of many human beings to actually meet this standard might explain why approximately half the American population is on some sort of psychotropic medication, e.g. antidepressants. If you need the Yerevan standard of personal involvement from others, the Anglo-American culture is about the worst for that.
Speaking of drugs–and I feel this is quite germane to the issue of “individualism” and social psychology, which is why I put it in this section: drugs they are a huge and extremely pervasive social problem, and you’re bound to collide with that reality sooner or later, directly or indirectly. A substantial proportion of the GDP depends in some way either on the production, distribution and consumption of drugs, or on enforcing draconian laws against it. There’s quite a lot of what one might call industrial-scale militarisation on both sides. Like any war, it’s damaging even to the victors, there is enormous collateral damage to civilian bystanders, and it’s hard to tell who the real villains are. By Armenian standards, the US can be criminal, gritty and dangerous in unexpected ways.
More interestingly, perhaps, the world of legal drugs bleeds easily into the illegal, as evidenced by widespread illegal abuse of prescription painkillers and the entirely legal overprescription of psychoactive medications such as amphetamines. Americans are probably the most psychoactively medicated people on the planet. The whole legal-illegal distinction is a nebulous, foggy continuum in a place with so much regulatory capture and other corruption driven by mega-pharmaceutical shysterism.
As I tell every Yerevan taxi driver who lyricises America, “like everything else, it’s got its pluses and minuses”.
The US is a good place for the incorrigibly entrepreneurial and the well-paid, and in either case, the young. It’s a good place to be if you’re in a well-remunerated profession that is complementary to machine intelligence and other emergent trends indicative of the future of employment in “post-industrial” economies. It still offers a dynamic business climate–something that is as much a function of culture as of regulation and economics. It’s an intriguingly diverse multicultural “melting pot” where just about anyone can find a social group of likeminded people, which owes much to both its size and its history as a nation of immigrants. If the more collectivist psychology of the East is your vexation, the strong current of individualism and independence in American culture would probably an ideal antidote. For certain kinds of people, the US has much to recommend it.
However, I hope I have tempered that with some sober realities about the challenges of everyday life. The US lacks many of the socially stabilising factors and policy objectives of Western European countries. If you’re looking for a calm, moderate life and are allergic to extremes, I suggest you set your sights upon another OECD country to romanticise. Either way, I would pause and take a minute before reflexively deeming a visiting American to be enviably rich and happy.
There’s no paradise anywhere.
I have an acquaintance that has tried numerous times to persuade me that Osama bin Laden was not killed in a commando raid in Abbottabad in 2011, but actually died of natural causes back in 2001. Just look at the photos of bin Laden in the press from the last ten years on WhatReallyHappened.com! They are “obviously” doctored!
We all know that one guy, or several. They’re devotees of their favourite “what the government doesn’t want you to know” web site. When you tell them that such claims, while interesting, suffer from a dire lack of peer review and corroboration from credible sources, that just amps them up even more: “I don’t need the megacorporate disinformation machine to know what’s true. I think independently. Free your mind! Look at the photos and judge for yourself; could the World Trade Center towers really have collapsed due to fire?”
There’s no arguing with conspiracy theorists. The conversation is complicated by the fact that established media certainly have, in their history, disseminated their share of outright lies, or, far more often, omissions and skewed narratives. Mainstream media often disseminate Official Truth in any country and political system, and, in more democratic societies, this is sometimes done under the guise of hard-hitting investigational journalism and putative independence. Yet, anyone who’s grown beyond the infantile thumb-sucking stage of critical thinking understands that the idea of media as a professionally neutral conveyor of consistently objective truth is, at a minimum, complicated and caveat-ridden, and perhaps even slightly risible. Furthermore, amidst the noise on WhatReallyHappened.com and tenc.net there are, in bits and pieces, some kernels of truth.
Such a polemic cannot be made intelligible by arguing about “the facts”, as people are wont to do with conspiracy theorists. This is a trap. What does the idea of “the facts” even mean? To my mind, this issue goes back to the very nature of our knowledge about the external world, and is, at heart, a philosophical issue.
In a sense, it’s a fundamentally defeatist stance, because if we’re going to interrogate the pillars of our construction of “the facts”, we have to be very honest about the limits of what we can justifiably claim to know. It’s the only reasonable thing to do. However, our loony friends aren’t going to reciprocate our concessions; you may not be completely sure about anything (because you cannot reasonably be, as I’ll discuss below), but the guy writing at TheNewReichstagFire.com/the-big-lie-always-works-time-after-time/ about how 757s don’t just smash into the Pentagon like that? He’s sure. Very sure. Your vague, slightly noncommittal scepticism is no match for his positive assertions. And yet, there are reasons why it’s more justifiable to believe The New York Times account than his.
For those who slept through their Philosophy 101 course (or an introductory course to scientific methodology), let’s revisit a well-beaten horse. There are two types of reasoning recognised in logical argumentation: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning.
Deductive reasoning is the kind that is used to reach certain conclusions based on ironclad axioms of logic. It is used in self-contained systems of well-defined rules, such as mathematics. The kinds of proofs you used to do in geometry class are deductive in nature, because the conclusion follows certainly from the premises.
The simplest illustration of a deductive claim is a syllogism such as:
- All men are yellow;
- Alex is a man.
- Therefore, Alex is yellow.
Alex’s yellowness follows from the premises (the first two points). It cannot be otherwise. Given the premise that he’s a man and that all men are yellow, he must be yellow.
Note that we haven’t considered the question of whether all men are, in fact, factually yellow. That is not essential for this claim to be deductively true. Maybe not all men are yellow. Maybe Alex is not a man (though, I’m pretty sure I am). The claim is simply that given that all men are yellow and that Alex is a man, he must be yellow.
Deductive logic has relatively narrow applications in the grand universe of human endeavours. It’s usable in bounded systems that meet the Closed-World Assumption, most notably in the field of mathematics, but also, in a more applied dimension, in finite deterministic systems, such as for example in electronics.
Inductive reasoning is the other kind of reasoning. Inductive claims are probabilistic in nature. A strong inductive claim is a “good bet”, not a guaranteed or certain conclusion. An example of an inductive claim would be:
- The Sun has risen every day.
- Tomorrow is a new day.
- Therefore, the Sun will rise tomorrow.
There’s no guarantee the Sun will rise tomorrow merely on the basis of the fact that it has done so in the past. It could explode overnight. You never know. But, it’s a pretty good bet that it will rise tomorrow; it’s had a pretty consistent track record of doing that. Of course, to flesh out this claim realistically requires quite a bit more premises about what we know to be true about the Sun, quite apart from the fact that it rises. But even if we add all the scientific knowledge in the world, there’s still no logical guarantee that the Sun will, in fact, rise tomorrow. Maybe it won’t. But it probably will. And that’s the essence of inductive reasoning.
Pretty much all human knowledge is based on inductive claims. Pretty much anything humans say to each other, ever, is based on a giant cascade of inductive claims. There’s not much that we know about the outside world that could be said to be deductively true. Deductive claims participate in inherently synthetic universes. That’s why it’s a bit silly when a person arguing with another about who really shot John F. Kennedy says: “Your logic is terrible!” The other party’s logic is probably not wrong–at least, not in the sense of deductive logic. Most intelligent people are pretty good at basic deductive logic. The disagreement is generally about the truth or falsehood of the premises, or about their evidentiary relationship to the conclusion being advanced. Lee Harvey Oswald may have been on the top floor of the Texas Schoolbook Depository with a rifle, but how can you be sure he shot Kennedy?
Even direct human sensory experience can be called into some doubt: just because you’ve seen it with your own eyes doesn’t mean it’s true. The very idea of perceived physical reality as being “true” has been the subject of ongoing philosophical contention. It relies on a lot of metaphysical assumptions, such as that causes resemble their effects (just because you feel like you’re sitting in this chair and it feels very “chair-like” doesn’t mean the underlying object–if it even exists–is essentially “chair-like”).
Worse yet, inductive logic is not deductively valid. The Scottish philosopher David Hume famously pointed out that the justification for inductive logic uses circular reasoning, because the only real justification for inductive reasoning is that inductive reasoning has worked in the past–itself an inductive claim. “Induction, because induction” isn’t very persuasive, and it certainly isn’t what most people would intuitively call “logical”.
But, this wouldn’t be a very interesting post if I ended it on a note of “so, you really don’t know anything at all, period”. Let’s skip over the metaphysical issues and assume, among other things, that our direct sensory experience of reality is mostly accurate, in the sense that the underlying reality meaningfully resembles our apprehension of it through our five senses.
So, back to journalism. When you open the The New York Times, do you really know that anything you see is true at all? Have you ever even been physically present, in a position to directly observe any occurrence that the Times has reported on? I’m not sure that I have. Most people haven’t either. And even if you have, it’s probably something that happens a few times in a lifetime, unless you’re the President.
The metro section says there was a fire on 125th St. It’s got photos of fire engines and a menacing blaze. Were you there? Did you see it? Probably not. Maybe it’s all fake. Maybe the whole story is a fake. Maybe there was no fire.
Maybe. But it’s probably true. It’s true because you can’t think of a compelling reason for the Times to make something like that up, a matter of fact seemingly without any ideological valence or political magnitude. It’s true because other articles on similar events in the past have been supported by the testimony of people you know. It’s true because the same, or substantially similar report is also carried by other local newspapers, television stations, and online sources, and an elaborate conspiracy among them all to convincingly report a fake fire is unparsimonious. It’s true because the Times would not be considered a credible news source if it just made stuff up all the time.
And yet, all of those are inductive claims. The last premise is particularly ludicrous, as it is circular: the Times is credible because it’s credible. Certainly, it could be that all of these different sources of information that you’re cross-referencing and integrating elaborately conspired to report on a fire that never happened, motivated by reasons unknown to us. It doesn’t pass Occam’s Razor, but it certainly wouldn’t be the first time they’ve reported something that was subsequently shown to be completely false; Gulf of Tonkin incident, anybody? And yet, when I say “shown”, was it shown to you? No, it was “shown” by other sources that you believe to be credible, because you’ve experienced them as having credibility in the past.
Well, that’s very inductive of you. And it’s deductively illogical. You can’t prove any of it. Your justifications are just other inductive claims; things you reasonably believe to have a high probability of being true, but you are in no position to directly verify. Indeed, it’s safe to say that ninety nine percent of human knowledge–which we utilise with great conviction every day–is that way: for all our cosmopolitanism, there’s not a whole lot in the range of an individual human’s direct observation and experience. You’ve probably never experimentally verified whether hypothermia truly sets in at or below 35C. Have you ever personally tested whether antibiotics really work? You’ve probably taken them, but what if it was just your awesome immune system? Want to give yourself and your friends a menacing infection and really explore it with some rigour? Be sure there’s a control, someone’s got to get the placebos!
Most of the time people are arguing about any matters of fact in the outside world, they are arguing about things they have never seen or touched; they just read about it somewhere. I confidently contend that you can land a Cirrus SR22 (given a longer runway) without flaps safely because a pilot told me so, citing the Cirrus operator’s manual. But hell if I’ve ever tried. I don’t even know how to deploy the flaps on a Cirrus. I don’t even know how to get it up in the air. Yet, I’m perfectly comfortable making this claim to you, and I’ll bet you $1000 it’s true.
Have you ever been to Niue? What if Niue doesn’t really exist? But surely it does! And yet, all the reasons you have for supposing so are based, foundationally, on other inductive claims, few or none of which you’ve directly verified. You simply suppose that atlases and maps generally reflect geographic fact, and that if there’s an entry in Wikipedia, it must be true. How gullible of you! (Incidentally, there have been plenty of fake entries on Wikipedia. What if the entry for the planet Jupiter is one of them? Is Jupiter a real thing?)
Even the meaning of everyday work of researchers and specialists in scientific fields relies on their belief in inductive assumptions that are widely held in their field. These inductive assumptions are sometimes invalidated, and, throughout history, have undergone massive upheaval and revolution. It’s actually quite possible to invalidate decades or centuries of scientific labour with a shift in high-level assumptions. (There is an entire field, Philosophy of Science, that seeks to properly capture or describe the process of how all this actually happens at a theoretical level, as well as to sometimes make prescriptions about how it ought to work.)
I think we’ve satisfactorily illustrated that nearly all knowledge about the external world is premised on a complex, interdependent house of cards, where the cards are inductive claims. Where it leads us with regard to journalistic credibility is this:
It is reasonable to say that The New York Times occupies a higher place in an inductive “hierarchy of believability” than does WhatReallyHappened.com or something Alex Jones said. It is higher in that hierarchy because, on average, the things written in it correlate much more extensively and profoundly with other sources of (inductive) knowledge that we draw upon elsewhere. We believe that the Times is a more professional journalistic enterprise that goes to greater lengths to check its facts, review its sources and report the truth, because of other things that we believe to be true about journalistic organisations that do and don’t do that (the latter are seldom cited as a source of truth across a wide spectrum of human endeavours).
None of this guarantees that any given thing written in the Times is true. I personally cannot say that the World Trade Center towers definitively did not collapse due to a controlled demolition. But, Mr. What-They-Don’t-Want-You-To-Know can’t say that they did so, either, and that’s what he’s missing. Like me, he wasn’t there, and he’s no more of a structural engineer than I am. What’s more, my secondhand source is better than his.
Provable? Absolutely not. It’s just a better bet.
Armenian economists, diaspora repatriates, and development evangelists offer many idealistic proposals about how Armenia can reverse its inexorable decline and parlay the forces of its gradual disintegration into positive economic growth and regional leadership. Most of these are plainly quixotic, at least to anyone with even cursory insight into everyday Armenian reality and demographic trends. They do not give one the sense of having been united with the probable.
However, on this spectrum of bright-eyed, bushy-tailed pronouncements, the idea of Armenia becoming a major IT centre is one of the less wholly implausible ones. Politicians and self-appointed diaspora luminaries say the darndest, most fantastical things; of all of their grandiose ideas, for Armenia to traffic in virtual goods is probably not the most far-fetched, if only because the messengers of progress have set a high standard with their pompous rhetoric.
I don’t have much experience working within the local IT market, though I do have plenty of colleagues in the IT field in Yerevan. Nevertheless, true to my well-established tendency, I’ll dubiously anoint myself enough of an authority to give an outsider’s impression about the merits of this thesis that Armenia should hitch its wagon to tech. Then, maybe insiders can tell me why I’ve got it all wrong.
The backdrop of strong Soviet-era fundamentals in science and engineering helps in Armenia, too. Armenian engineers are, classically, quite capable. Moreover, the hardships this generation of IT people have had to live through in the bedlam of the 1990s has given them a lot of adaptability, flexibility, and resolve. They’ve definitely got the stereotypical Soviet MacGyver-type knack for improvisation. Among my circle of acquaintances are many people who learned to program during the dark years of the electrical crisis and the Nagorno-Karabakh War, squeezing a few hours a day of power for their third-rate computers out of car batteries, charged by tenuous methods of dubious legality, at a time when Yerevan was plunged into near-total darkness and bitter winter cold. People were burning books and random objects at the time for heating fuel. They pioneered low-baud Internet connectivity through Moscow in extremely inhospitable conditions. They paid obscene rates for Internet and telephone service in the heyday of the ArmenTel monopoly, and still more obscene black market rates for aftermarket mobile devices. As far as the pampered, effete cubicle-dwellers of the “developed world” are concerned, these guys might as well have been working on punchcards by candlelight. They would’ve given a lot to have had mere Office Space problems.
But, for the most part these people left a long time ago. It doesn’t take a genius to recognise that with these kinds of skills, one could make proportionally better money abroad, even offset against higher living costs, while opening greater career development and life opportunities for themselves and their families. Moreover, these guys have an advantage that many other Armenians trying to leave the country don’t. Steeped in the Western-rooted shared culture of the Internet, they have a good command of the English language and soaked up a lot of globalist ideas that make them highly fraternal with their nerdy American and European counterparts. They’ve also got the Russian IT culture and language angle, which is very influential in Armenia as well, so they can migrate to Eastern Europe, too. Economically speaking, it’s a lot easier for foreign companies to plug clever Armenian technologists straight into their workforce, because they’re not so different from the domestic clever technologists. The homogenising force of the Internet definitely offers an efficiency benefit to both labour and management.
Understand, too, that there are ways to eke out a meager living doing IT in developing economies that effectively don’t exist in the developed world anymore, because they’ve been obsoleted, rationalised and optimised away. When’s the last time you saw a general, all-inclusive computer store in First World countries (Chinese importers notwithstanding)? Non-tech people may be forgiven for thinking that the guys at one of Yerevan’s innumerable computer stores that know how to repair PCs, clean spyware, make some simple web sites, and wire up small business LANs are pretty sharp, but their skill set is not globally competitive. They can’t emigrate on that basis. All that stuff is long commoditised. To find work abroad, one has to have specialised, nontrivial and current skills that are intra-industrially useful. However, the same applies to Armenia: this tier of technicians isn’t qualified to hold up the weight of Armenian infrastructure and economic development on their shoulders either. All in all, there may be a fair amount of computer-savvy guys in Yerevan, but there are actually very few, if you see what I mean.
So, as far as I can tell, the main limitation on any Armenian aspiration to become an IT major is the severe shortage of qualified people. Everyone prattles on about a shortage of qualified tech people in every market, but as with all other problems, in Armenia the problem is much more acute, sharp and concentrated, due to its tiny size. There’s a small skeleton crew of highly competent remnants holding down the fort (i.e. people who didn’t manage to leave for one reason or another, usually family or personal reasons rather than lack of opportunities to do so), but even among them, emigration is a major theme of discussion. As all other highly qualified specialists, productive workers and capable entrepreneurs in Armenia, they’re getting fed up and leaving. Many developing countries and ex-Soviet republics are bleeding specialists, but other countries have a lot more people to bleed. Armenia is haemorrhaging.
I don’t see a crop of up-and-coming youngsters that stand to viably replace the classic hackers of the 1990s. The few especially capable ones generally take the shortcut of leaving. It’s the same old song of Armenia: everybody’s leaving. Thus, I take no pleasure in elucidating the obvious conclusion to anyone thinking of turning Armenia into a globally competitive IT centre: where’s your globally competitive work force?
Any IT business in Armenia with aspirations of making real money must, by definition, be export-oriented. There’s no money to be made in selling into the local market. The only IT companies in Armenia I’m familiar with that make any money–and I’m not counting outsourced development or engineering divisions of foreign companies here–are ones that service government contracts and foreign orders.
The local market has IT needs, of course, but they’re pretty pedestrian and connected to low-margin products and services–the kinds of things that are, in terms of their global cost structure, only viable at a large scale. The killer is a triple curse:
- Small market size, and therefore, no economies of scale, as well as fierce competition and saturation;
- Poverty; it is possible to sell into a small market, but only if it’s a rich economy. Armenia is basically city-state size, but it’s no Singapore;
- Relatively undeveloped, traditional economy. There’s not that many businesses in Armenia that have a need for sophisticated technological capital goods.
There’s other problems related to the last point as well. Armenian businesses are, as a matter of cultural disposition, cheap quite apart from their relative poverty, as Armenians are historically given to commerce with an Eastern bent. Few proprietors seem to have made the shift to a post-industrial mindset that divorces the subconscious perception of “value” from the idea of “tangible goods” while strongly incorporating the idea of shopping on value rather than price.
Traditional economies have never lent themselves especially well to Western-style economic rationalism and efficiency, either. Say what you will about the humanistic effects of that rationalism (which I would characterise somewhat ambivalently), but the reality is that a strong cultural focus on optimising workflows and business processes drives much of the demand for IT universally.
Yerevan actually has rather good and ubiquitous FTTH-based consumer broadband. However, it’s easy to forget that the country’s connections to the outside world are tenuous and reflect its geopolitically precarious position. Armenia’s only real connection to the greater Internet is through the neighbouring republic of Georgia, and it’s quite easy to take the whole country offline, as the world learned in April 2011 (The Guardian).
I’m told that the fibre paths have got a bit more diverse now, but there’s not that much diversity you can add to a largely mountainous, landlocked country most of whose land borders are closed. Armenia’s border with Turkey has been closed since 1994 and has no cross-border telecommunication connections, and the border with Azerbaijan is ever-so-slightly militarised, you might say. Together with the Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan, that’s about 85% of Armenia’s land borders. As with many other things, Armenia clings to life through Georgia, subject to its whims and caprices, as well as the geophysical realities of doing so. To the south, Iran is connected to some very robust, high-bandwidth Persian Gulf cable systems, but, I’m told that for fairly obvious political reasons, the Internet link through Iran isn’t used much (if at all).
The inability to build redundant, multilateral physical connections to its neighbours makes Armenia quite ill-suited to the operation of any regionally significant Internet interconnection exchange or peering point. Armenian utility power is fairly reliable (as long as the Metsamor reactor keeps running), but definitely at “developing world” levels of redundancy. The power frequency isn’t terribly clean. There is high seismic risk. Wholesale IP bandwidth to the outside world is quite expensive. All these things likely preclude the possibility of Armenia hosting a real data centre or getting into the hosting or “cloud” business in a big way. So you want to operate a network? Who are you going to network with?
IT also depends on strong logistical links to the outside world and benefits from proximity to supply chains. Armenia is landlocked and largely blockaded, and, on account of its small size, constitutes an exotic, high-cost shipping destination. No access to open water means expensive transit through Georgia’s Black Sea ports, or even more expensive air cargo. Slow and unreliable internal logistics, as well as high import duties, are also a killer.
It takes more than just electricity, Internet connectivity and low labour costs to create or sustain a significant IT sector. IT is highly interdependent and horizontally allied with a variety of other inputs, all of which require a critical mass of economic activity and sophistication to sustain.
I hear all kinds of nonsense from diaspora tech people about how Armenia can be an incredible startup hub because of its low costs. However, startups need clean business climates, low barriers to entry, transparent financial institutions, easy access to relatively abundant financing, and a critical mass of other startups that concentrates talented, experienced people in one place. There must be some sort of established and humming growth, exit and/or liquidation track. Armenia doesn’t offer much of that. Cheap labour does not a startup hub make. Without the right factors of production (principally human ones), any spark will quickly fizzle out.
None of this is to denigrate the efforts of the Yerevan tech startup community to do what it can with what it’s got. However, the chances of an Asian Tiger-type economic miracle there are vanishingly slim in my estimation.
It seems to me that government officials haven’t actually caught onto IT as a source of wealth or value yet. For the most part, they are rather sclerotic, stuck in the mindset of twentieth century industrialists and in keeping with Armenia’s largely traditional economic composition: if it’s not a physical good, it’s not a real thing that actually matters. Actually, this is probably a good thing; if technology companies weren’t so “under the radar”, they’d be subject to the same harsh extortion and shakedown racket that the notoriously corrupt bureaucracy, in concert with large business interests, visits upon most businesses in Armenia. It’s only a matter of time until they fully realise that there’s more to IT than just a bunch of guys sat at desks typing or whatnot.
In light of this, talk of crafty government policy incentives to lure startups or foster a more teeming IT investment climate seems like a very distant pipe dream.
IT is a globally competitive field. If you want to compete, you have to answer the fundamental question of just what it is that you can offer that is better than other countries or locales, or at least on par with other countries and locales. Generally-accepted criteria for a market poised to break out in IT include:
- Abundant human capital at a low cost (Armenia’s got the low cost, but not the abundant human capital);
- Adequate physical infrastructure;
- Logistical integration with the outside world — easy to travel to, ship to and do business with (this is particularly important if Armenia’s destiny were to become an “outsourcing centre” rather than a “startup hub”, and the “outsourcing centre” seems like a more practical step);
- Relatively transparent regulatory and legal climate;
- Location that is in some way central or regionally significant;
- Established education pipeline to feed the human talent pool, in some significant volume;
- Concentrated networks of financing resources, advisors, mentors and talent.
Does Armenia have any of this?
Rather than becoming a startup zoo, the more likely emergent development track for a place like Armenia is to work on becoming an offshore development centre, which is a simpler, dumber configuration that doesn’t make such enormous demands on its scarce and ill-prepared ecosystem.
This is the same sort of thing that propelled India to IT-led economic growth, and in principle, it seems possible. I’ve seen a number of American companies move their development offices to Yerevan, or acquire Armenian companies seemingly for the purpose of leveraging their existing engineering talent.
If this trend were to gain any traction, it might help to retain Armenian IT talent in Armenia. However, there is a natural tension between this and the downward wage pressure that gives offshoring its competitive edge from the point of view of the arbitrageur.
Still, I think if there’s any hope of IT taking a real hold in Armenia as an export, it’s probably going to proceed down this route. However, it would benefit a lot from government incentives to nurture it, as well as movement toward greater administrative and financial transparency that is going to be at odds with Armenia’s endemic corruption.
The biggest cause for pessimism is, in my mind, the lack of a critical mass of local talent. I don’t see where these companies are going to find enough local bodies. Seemingly in recognition of this fact, I’ve even heard proposals to convince IT-able diaspora Armenians to move to Armenia and ply their craft there for foreign companies, but when pressing for details on how to pull off this feat of psychological alchemy? I get crickets. Diaspora Armenians are sometimes strongly receptive to nationalist-irredentist demagoguery, though, so I suppose one could do it with ideological bombardment. The sorts of people who are easily persuaded by that sort of claptrap don’t tend to make very talented engineers, though; computing work requires good critical thinking.
A side note about Tumo
Tumo has occasionally been trotted out to me as a vanguard of Armenia’s high-technology future. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to take a very in-depth tour once and see it firsthand before passing judgment.
I’m afraid I have little to say in praise of Tumo as a job skills creation engine, at least from the perspective of an engineer. They’ve taken what was fundamentally a rather good idea, backed by very significant money, lots of good hardware, a nice in-house curriculum management and interactive lesson delivery platform, and squandered it on teaching kids “lite” stuff that doesn’t matter. This focus on animation, design and media may be sexy, but if they want to give kids the foundation for skills that will actually help them thrive in critical, high-value roles, they need to put all this fluffy multimedia away and focus on serious software engineering and operations. That would take a rather radical retooling away from what they’re set up for now.
I’m all for artistic endeavours, but if you want to talk about Tumo as a player in some possibility of a serious future for Armenia through IT, these design-oriented skill sets do not represent an effective vehicle for investment in that viewpoint. They need to learn a thing or two from the people that went to the 1990s school of hard knocks.
If there are still any left in Armenia by the time this goes to press.